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The renegotiation of road projects has been an important issue that has generated 
concerns in PPP procurement over the last decade. This has had serious policy 
implications for public procurement policy across countries because of its 
implications for the achievement of the objectives defined at the inception of PPP 
road contracts. This paper assesses the renegotiation of Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP) infrastructure projects in order to identify the issues involved in renegotiation 
and its outcomes. Data were collected through a literature review of selected studies 
on PPP infrastructure projects on a sectoral basis with particular emphasis on Latin 
America, Portugal and Spain. It was revealed that a high proportion of PPP contracts 
in the transport sector are renegotiated: Indeed, in the transport sector, more PPP road 
projects are renegotiated than other forms of transport projects. The main factors 
surrounding the renegotiation of road contracts are: lack of an adequate contract 
design, frequent opportunistic behaviour on the part of both public and private 
partners during the implementation of PPP road projects, changes in the conditions 
affecting revenue and costs beyond the reasonable assumptions accounted for in the 
original contract, corruption, and political and economic instability, all of which in 
most instances reduce the chance of  the public partner achieving its objective of 
value for money (VfM). The paper concludes with a discussion of the need to develop 
a framework for integrating considerations of value for money into the renegotiation 
process of PPP road contracts. 
Keywords: public-private partnership (PPP), renegotiation, road contracts, transport 
sector, value for money (VfM). 
INTRODUCTION 
The impact of transport infrastructure provision cannot be over-emphasised in the 
growth and development of any nation’s economy. Gor and Gitau (2010) give 
credence to the role transport infrastructure plays in the enhancement of economic 
activities by identifying the road transport sub-sector as accounting for 90% of 
passenger and freight surface transport in Kenya. Because of the need to provide 
adequate and efficient transport infrastructure, governments of various countries have 
sought forms of procurement which ensure free and safe infrastructure on the most 
economical basis (Akintoye and Chinyio, 2005). However, the failures or 
inadequacies of some early forms of procurement have led most developed countries 
and some developing nations to adopt PPP for the delivery of transport infrastructure.  
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PPP is a joint working relationship between the private sector and public bodies in 
which the two parties agree to pool their respective resources and share the risks of the 
proposed infrastructure project for mutual benefit and in the interest of members of 
the public or taxpayers. In spite of the numerous benefits of PPP to stakeholders, 
events usually occur during the implementation of projects that necessitate 
renegotiation of PPP contracts (Sarmento, 2014, Acerete et al., 2010). Though 
renegotiation may be necessary and expedient in order to align the contract to defined 
objectives and to keep it on track, most renegotiations of infrastructure projects have 
not addressed the VfM objectives and users’ expectation. Instead, they have increased 
the costs to the public agencies, which is to the detriment of the users (Sarmento, 
2014). There is therefore a need to strategise ways to curb the negative impact of 
renegotiation. 
This paper is based on the findings of the literature review of ongoing PhD research, 
targeted at developing a value-for-money framework for the renegotiation of PPP road 
projects. The renegotiation of PPP road contracts is assessed through a review of 
selected cases in the transport sector. This will be discussed with a focus on road 
projects in order to identify both the reasons for and the outcomes of contract 
renegotiation. The rationale for this focus is the high incidence of renegotiation in 
road projects when compared to other transport modes, coupled with their 
implications for the achievement of VfM. Thus the purpose of the paper will be 
fulfilled using literature published in journals and other sources. The authors have 
restricted the literature search to relevant up to date papers, i.e. those on the 
renegotiation of PPP transport projects within the last 10 years.    
THE RENEGOTIATION IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
CONTRACTS 
Some of the definitions of renegotiation suggest that it is an un-anticipated change in 
the conditions or terms of a contract as a result of unexpected events which results in 
the amendment of the contract (Guasch et. al. 2014 and Mackovsek et al. 2014). The 
extent of the work or the project scope could be impacted by an unexpected change. 
This change is not usually provided or defined in the original contract at the time of 
contract formation.  However, there may be a clause in the contract, which provides 
that the contract may be subject to renegotiation. 
 Nikolaidis and Roumboutsos (2013) explicitly describe the process of renegotiation 
in PPP projects as a bargaining process, in which the parties involved seek to reach 
agreement on a particular option from a set of available alternatives. Renegotiation of 
contract has also been seen as procedure involving decision making in a collective 
manner (Sarmento 2010). Thus, renegotiation is a decision making process which 
involves the choice or selection of a course of action from a list of alternatives or 
options in response to a specific need (Sarmento and Renneboog 2014). However, the 
process of decision making is guided by the agreed procedure, which could differ 
between PPP projects and countries (Sarmento 2014). 
Renegotiations of contracts have been successful in some instances, but on other 
occasion they have resulted in delays and cost overruns during project implementation 
(Acerete et al. 2010).  This conclusion is also supported by PPP studies conducted in 
Latin America (Bitran et al. 2013) and Spain (Acerete et al. 2010). The renegotiations 
discussed in both scientific and government reports in the past decade are thus 
considered in terms of their impact on the achievement of defined objectives (De Brux 
2010). The reason for this is that the stakeholders in PPP contracts seek to fulfil their 
respective objectives during the renegotiation of PPP projects. However, the interest 
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of these stakeholders differ, and as a result synergy is required to achieve an outcome 
satisfactory to all parties while delivering the PPP project within contract provisions. 
REASONS FOR THE RENEGOTIATION OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS 
The driving factors for PPP contract renegotiations in Spain include: faulty contract 
design, defective regulation, over-estimation of traffic, inflexible contracts, changing 
construction risks and inadequate strategic network planning among others (Acerete et 
al. 2010). Nikolaidis and Roumboutsos (2013) also identify the inaccurate evaluation 
of the volume of traffic expected as a reason for major PPP contract renegotiations in 
Greece, which may result in a reduction or increase in the projected traffic. Gifford et 
al. (2014) notes that insufficient evidence exists with regards to drivers of 
renegotiation in the United States. Other reasons identified at the planning, 
construction and operation stage may require government to take over or provide 
subsidies to the project (Bi and Wang 2011). Also, Trebilcock and Rosenstock (2015) 
identify low-balling by private players in the competitive bidding stage, opportunism, 
lower than expected demand and unforeseen changes in the project environment as 
factors leading to major PPP renegotiations. This shows that there are many factors 
responsible for PPP contract renegotiations. 
A comprehensive examination of all the factors associated with renegotiation reveals 
that opportunism is the bane of contract renegotiation (De Brux 2010). Under bidding, 
free riding, sitting on the job, poor quality of performance, hostile takeover, power 
misuse and social surplus capture have all been identified as manifestation of 
opportunism (Odoemena and Horita 2014). This list, along with the findings of several 
studies on renegotiation, has thus identified opportunism on the part of the private 
partner as more pronounced in transport projects (Bitran et al. 2013; Bi and Wang, 
2011). However, governments use renegotiation as a means of evading budget 
scrutiny in order to increase PPP infrastructure spending (Engel et al. 2006), although 
recent studies reveal that opportunistic behaviour on the part the private partner is 
higher than that of public agencies in PPP infrastructure project procurement (Bitran 
et al. 2013, and Bi and Wang 2011).   
RENEGOTIATION INCIDENCES IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP ROAD CONTRACTS 
An examination of renegotiation of PPP contracts around notable countries and 
regions of the world, including their frequency and outcomes, is necessary to advance 
the understanding of the subject. Recent studies have evaluated the instances of PPP 
contract renegotiations in Latin American and Caribbean countries (Guasch et al. 
2014), Spain (Baeza and Vassallo 2010) and Portugal (Sarmento 2014). These studies 
show that Portugal, Spain and Latin American/Caribbean countries have a long history 
of public service concessions that started in the late 1960s and early 1970s, initially in 
the transport and water sectors (Baeza and Vassallo 2010).  
Specific studies have also been conducted in European countries such as Portugal 
(Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014), Spain (Acerete et al. 2010), Greece (Nikolaidis and 
Roumboutsos 2013) and the UK (Bain 2010). Also, Engel et al. (2006) reveal that 
more than 1,000 PPP projects in Latin American from 1985-2000 were procured, 
41.5% of which culminated on renegotiation.  Evidence from some of these studies 
thus reinforces previous findings that toll motorway concession contracts are 
characterized by two features: significant traffic overestimations and frequent 
renegotiations (Baeza and Vassallo 2010, Acerete et al. 2010).  In other words, road 
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projects have been found to be commonly renegotiated in the transport sector of most 
of these countries.  Table 1 shows the respective incidences of renegotiations across 
sectors to support this conclusion. 
Table 1: Incidence of Renegotiation across Selected Sector 
 
The data presented in Table 1 supports the findings of the previous literature and puts 
road projects ahead of other modes of transport in terms of renegotiation. In all, it is 
calculated that 41.5% of projects overall were renegotiated, with   the highest 
percentage being those in the water and sanitation sector. This was followed by the 
transport sector (54.7%), and within this sector road projects are the most renegotiated 
with 57.3%. Thus Table 2 supports these findings by showing the respective 
percentages of renegotiated contracts across countries and sectors. 
Table 2: Incidences of renegotiations of PPP in selected regions of the world 
 
Table 2 suggests that renegotiation of PPP road projects is common in Latin American 
&and Caribbean countries. Contracts in the water and and sanitation sector are the 
most often renegotiated, followed by those in the transport sector, as previously 
established. In the UK, no data is available with respect to the percentage of contracts 
renegotiation incidences on a sectoral basis, although generalised information, which 
cuts across all sectors is provided. However, Table 3 gives a vivid account of the 
frequency of renegotiation in developed countries with respect to both Portugal and 
Spain. 




Table 3 presents data for PPP contract renegotiation in Portugal and Spain.  22 PPP 
road projects in Portugal were investigated, while 17 road projects were investigated 
in Spain. The table shows the characteristics of these projects, their expected duration 
and the number of renegotiations per project for both countries. The figures indicate 
that more renegotiation occurs in the road projects of Portugal than in those of Spain, 
although to varying degrees: Lusoponte had the highest number of renegotiations in 
Portugal (32), while El Ferro F-Portuguesa was second with 14 renegotiations). A 
close comparison of these renegotiation incidences reveals that there are variations 
across countries and justifies the argument that road projects are commonly 
renegotiated with varying incidences in the transport sector. 
THE OUTCOMES OF THE RENEGOTIATION OF ROAD 
PROJECTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
High repayment by the public sector for a long period in order to offset cost is one of 
the outcomes of the renegotiation of PPP transport project contracts in Portugal 
(Sarmento and Renneboog 2014). In contrast, the outcomes of renegotiations in Spain 
and their respective percentages are: toll modification (50%), extension of the 
concession duration (24%), and other outcomes (26%) (Baeza and Vassallo 2010). 
Other studies have found the main outcomes of renegotiation in Latin America to 
include: tariff adjustments, revisions of cost components, adjustments of the annual 
fee paid by the operator to the government, changes in the asset base and extension of 
concession contracts (Guasch et al. 2014). This suggests that toll modification may be 
the most adopted and prominent outcome of the renegotiation of PPP concessions in 
Spain, which involves an alteration in the tariff or charges paid by users of the road.  
Furthermore, the renegotiation of road project contracts, according to Acerete et al., 
2010 have resulted in higher charges for Spanish road users. When there is a need for 
toll modification in Spain, the Spanish government has to step in to rescue the 
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situation. This is shown in the subsidies granted to the private sector in the case of 
eight old concessions in Spain in order to improve the viability of the scheme (Acerete 
et al., 2010). Thus, the government usually steps in to rescue failing projects and those 
experiencing difficulties through subsidies, financial adjustments or rebalancing 
(Sarmento, 2014, Xiong and Zhang, 2014).  
For instances, an examination of 254 renegotiations in Portuguese infrastructure 
projects reveals that the road sector accounted for 233 cases which ended with 
compensation being paid to the private company (Sarmento, 2014). In Latin America, 
experience reveals that 54.7% of transport concession contracts awarded were 
renegotiated and mostly benefited the concessionaires (Guasch, 2004). Furthermore, 
as Engel et al.  (2009) notes, the Chilean experience reveals that firms lowball their 
offers, expecting to break even through renegotiation. Contrastingly, this paper also 
reports that governments use renegotiations to increase spending and shift the burden 
of payment to future administrations. Furthermore, renegotiation of these concessions 
thus results in increases in the future costs of service for users.  
Moreover, according to Reside and Mendoza (2010), the Asian experience reveals that 
about 70% of PPPs are renegotiated due to currency risk, which in most instances 
results in increased subsidies and financial compensation for the concessionaire 
companies. Renegotiation of PPP projects also tends to be unfavourable to the public 
sector in United States of America (USA). However, the U.S. institutional framework 
have succeeded in protecting the public sector from private opportunism by 
guaranteeing service provision even in a situation where the private entity files for 
bankruptcy (Gifford et al. 2014). Thus, certain procedure or workable parameter could 
help in reducing public sector losses commonly experienced during renegotiation of 
PPP road projects. 
The reason for the financial rescue and rebalancing of concession contracts by 
governments is based on the fact that government is a major party in the concession 
agreement, with a major interest in the project’s completion (Nikolaidis and 
Roumboutsos, 2013). This is thus the main reason why public resources are usually 
devoted to covering private sector losses in PPP projects (Bi and Wang, 2011), which 
are mostly incurred as a result of the financial rescue of the projects. These losses, 
according to Sarmento (2014), are then transferred to the users in the form of higher 
tariffs and charges. Xiong and Zhang (2014) support this view by stating concisely 
that “international PPP practices have shown conflicting results in concession 
renegotiations”. Cases of contract renegotiation may therefore vary across countries 
and regions by virtue of the peculiarities and the prevailing situation. It is thus 
necessary to evaluate and assess renegotiation issues in the context of individual 
countries in order to ascertain the respective outcomes as they relate to the 
peculiarities and externalities of the prevailing environment. 
The comprehensive review of the existing literature in the area of renegotiation of PPP 
road projects results in the following findings: 
• Most PPP projects, and particularly road projects in the transport sector, are 
renegotiated; 
• Analysis of the renegotiation of PPP road projects across notable countries 
revealed that VfM is not achieved for the public sector in most cases; 
• Examination across countries, and particularly in Europe (including the UK), 
reveals scanty empirical data with respect to PPP road project renegotiations; 
• The few studies of PPP renegotiation available show that the extent and 
implications of VfM achievement in road projects remains a subject of research 
and debate. 
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VALUE FOR MONEY AND THE RENEGOTIATION OF PUBLIC 
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP ROAD PROJECTS 
Recent academic studies on PPP/PFI have focused on VfM in PPP projects (Sarmento 
and Renneboog 2014) because of its importance. Grimsey and Lewis (2005) define 
VfM as the optimum combination of whole life cycle costs, risks, completion time and 
quality in order to meet public requirements. VfM could therefore be viewed as a way 
of reducing the life cycle costs of PPP products through better risk allocation, faster 
implementation, improvement of the product and service quality and thus as a means 
of generating higher revenue for a public project. Based on this description, VfM is an 
important issue in infrastructure procurement, and has been considered the principal 
objective of any PPP project (Henjewele et al. 2011).  
It has been established from these studies that the achievement of VfM is an issue 
which has constituted a challenge in PPP procurement over the years. This indicates 
there is a need for further research, and motivated the present study. Few empirical 
studies have succeeded in exploring the ‘presumed’ relationships between 
renegotiation and VfM, which has been an issue in PPP procurement. Although these 
studies have established the importance of evaluating of renegotiation in terms of VfM 
achievement, few empirically assess the relationship between these two concepts in 
order to address the challenge of under- or non-achievement of VfM in PPP road 
project transactions.  
The investigation of PPP road projects is in response to the factors militating against 
the achievement of VfM, which is relevant and germane in the contemporary world. 
Investigation of PPP renegotiation in the road sector will go a long way to ensuring 
that an approach which incorporates VfM thinking can be identified and embedded in 
the renegotiation process.  Such an approach will involve the development of a 
framework that provides both a theoretical and a practical guide to stakeholders in the 
renegotiation of PPP road projects. The VfM framework proposed in this paper can be 
defined as one which seeks the reduction of whole life cycle costs through the 
development of workable parameters for the avoidance of cost and time overruns to 
facilitate implementation within budget and on time, improvement of service quality, 
and generation of appropriate and commensurate revenue for a public project without 
compromising profitable returns on the stakeholders’ investment. Fig 1 shows the 
conceptual classification of the research areas of the proposed PPP VfM renegotiation 
framework for road projects. 
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ONGOING RESEARCH TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
VALUE FOR MONEY FRAMEWORK 
This review has significance in that it arises from ongoing PhD research, and its focus 
relates to the  aim of that research, which is to investigate through empirical data 
collection the appropriate phases of PPP projects in order to ascertain renegotiation 
problems and issues that impact VfM implementation. Incidences and outcomes of 
renegotiation as well as the beneficiaries of the renegotiation process have been 
established for the following countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Portugal, Spain 
and Greece, as well as Caribbean countries. However, not much work/research has 
been done in the context of the European Union (EU), and particularly of the UK. 
Mackovsek et al. (2014) claim that the paucity of research in the area of PPP 
renegotiation is due to a lack of data on renegotiations and the nature of renegotiations 
in PPP projects (including road projects).  
This ongoing research therefore intends to investigate public agencies and 
concessionaires involved in PPP road projects in the UK. The reason for the adoption 
of the UK is that the UK has Europe’s largest programme of PPPs, with 400 
infrastructure projects in operation, which means that the UK constitutes around 25% 
of the overall EU PPP market (European Investment Bank 2004). In contrast, other 
countries such as Portugal, Spain and South Korea, all of which have adopted PPP for 
the delivery of road projects have initiated around 40 PPPs each (Baeza and Vassallo, 
2010; Reside and Mendoza 2010) but which have been the subject of a handful of 
studies on PPP renegotiation. It is therefore surprising that in spite of the profile of the 
UK in terms of its adoption of PPP for infrastructure projects, few theoretical studies 
have investigated renegotiation to evaluate the issues surrounding its occurrence 
during PPP project implementation. 
Indeed, studies conducted in the UK have not made available empirical data with 
respect to incidences of PPP renegotiation, the outcomes of PPP renegotiation or other 
issues inherent in implementation. This may be due to the fact that private firms rarely 
share information on such agreements and are even more unlikely to reveal 
information about renegotiation decisions and outcomes (Sarmento 2014). This is one 
of the challenges the research intends to overcome through the collection of data. 
Moreover, most PPP road projects in the UK are currently in the operation stage, and 
few have been completed.  
The study therefore investigates only long-standing PPP road projects and those which 
have been completed with the aim of remedying the dearth of empirical data on 
renegotiation in the UK. Thus, empirical data will be collected as a basis for 
appraising factors driving renegotiation, and the research will further assess the 
implications of value for money (VfM) achievement as a result of the renegotiation of 
road contracts as a basis for developing a workable framework for VfM 
implementation. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of this review reveal that private concessionaires are mostly beneficiaries 
of the renegotiation process because of the frequent intervention of the government to 
financially rescue PPP road projects, which are failing or experiencing difficulties. In 
other words, the outcome of most incidences of renegotiation favour the private 
concessionaire. In contrast, the outcome of the renegotiation of road projects has not 
always been in the best interest of members of the public. In this situation, value for 
money has mostly eluded the public agency. This is evidenced in increases in tariffs 
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and user charges, and in cost and time overruns. On this note, this paper concludes 
that there is need for the assessment and evaluation of the renegotiation of road 
projects in consideration of the failure to achieve value for money for the public sector 
in most instances. The ongoing research seeks to address this gap in knowledge 
through the development of a value for money framework for managing the 
renegotiation of PPP road projects. 
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